Eric’s Executive Summary

When you Google “Report From Iron Mountain” you’ll find it listed in the Guinness Book of World Records, as the longest running literary “Hoax” of all time. The “Hoax” part has nothing to do with the accuracy of the information within the report but instead with the authorship of the “report.” Leonard C. Lewin, a news reporter initially claimed that “John Dow, a professor at a large university in the Mid West” was part of a 15 man commission asked by the Department of Defense to evaluate the consequences of peace. Five years later, Lewin retracted this claim, thus creating the “Hoax.” That said, John Kenneth Galbraith, the well-known historian and professor at Harvard, has verified he was part of the team which put together the report. Regardless of who wrote the report, the question is, are the conclusions accurate. Or as Diane said to me after reading it, “this seams like the blue print our government has used for the past 30 years.”

The following is a list of what I consider the salient points.

**REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN: ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE**

With introductory material by Leonard C. Lewin

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FOREWORD

Its objective of the report was to determine, accurately and realistically, the nature of the problems that would confront the United States if and when a condition of "permanent peace" should arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with this contingency.

Overview

Lasting peace, while not theoretically impossible, is probably unattainable; even if it could be achieved it would almost certainly not be in the best interests of a stable society [Government] to achieve it.

War fills certain functions essential to the stability of our society [Government]; until other ways of filling them are developed, the war system must be maintained -- and improved in effectiveness.

"the lay reader, may not be prepared for some of its assumptions -- for instance, that most medical advances are viewed more as problems than as progress; or that poverty is necessary and desirable, public postures by politicians to the contrary notwithstanding; or that standing armies are, among other things social-welfare institutions in exactly the same sense as are old-people's homes and mental hospitals.

antimissile missile and fallout shelter programs are understood to have the spending of vast sums of money, not the advancement of science or national defense, as their principal goals, and to learn that "military" draft policies are only remotely concerned with defense.

He may be offended to find the organized repression of minority groups, and even the reestabliment of slavery, seriously (and on the whole favorably discussed as possible aspects of a world at peace. He is not likely to take kindly to the notion of the deliberate intensification of air and water pollution (as part of a program leading to peace), even when the reason for considering it is made clear. The Report's conclusions, repeated in its formal recommendations, that suggest that the long-range planning--and "budgeting" -- of the "optimum" number of lives to be destroyed annually in overt warfare is high on the Group's list of priorities for government action.

I cite these few examples primarily to warn the general reader what he can expect. The statesmen and strategists for whose eyes the Report was intended obviously need no such protective admonition.

…..

The Report….. explains, or certainly appears to explain, aspects of American policy otherwise incomprehensible by the ordinary standards of common sense.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the convener of this Group:

Attached is the Report of the Special Study Group established by you in August, 1963,

1) to consider the problems involved in the contingency of a transition to a general condition of peace, and

2) to recommend procedures for dealing with this contingency.

……..

It is our affirmative judgment that such action would not be in the public interest. …..

30 SEPTEMBER, 1966

INTRODUCTION

…. the broad problems to be anticipated in the event of general transformation of American society [Government] to a condition lacking its most critical current characteristics: its capability and readiness to make war when doing so is judged necessary or desirable by its political leadership.

…..
It is surely no exaggeration to say that a condition of general world peace would lead to changes in the social structures of the nations of the world of unparalleled and revolutionary magnitude. The economic impact of general disarmament, to name only the most obvious consequence of peace, would revise the production and distribution patterns of the globe to a degree that would make changes of the past fifty years seem insignificant. Political, sociological, cultural, and ecological changes would be equally far-reaching.

What, for instance, are the real functions of war in modern societies, beyond the ostensible ones of defending and advancing the "national interests" of nations?

The word peace, describes a condition entirely free from any form of the organized social violence, or threat of violence, generally known as war. It implies total and general disarmament.

SECTION 1 - SCOPE OF THE STUDY

An intention to avoid preconceived value judgments … but we have made a continuously self-conscious effort to deal with the problems of peace without, for example, considering that a condition of peace is per se "good" or "bad." This has not been easy, but it has been obligatory; to our knowledge, it has not been done before……. We, of course, do not equate stability with peace, but we accept it as the one common assumed objective of both peace and war.

It is obvious to any layman that the economic patterns of a warless world will be drastically different from those we live with today, and it is equally obvious that the political relationships of nations will not be those we have learned to take for granted, …. As we shall show, the relevance of peace and war to the internal political organization of societies, to the sociological relationships of their members, to psychological motivations, to ecological processes, and to cultural values is equally profound…….

SECTION 2 - DISARMAMENT AND THE ECONOMY

In this section we shall briefly examine … the expected impact of disarmament on the American economy. Whether disarmament is considered as a by-product of peace or as its precondition, its effect on the national economy will in either case be the most immediately felt of its consequences.

The "world war industry," …accounts for approximately a tenth of the output of the world's total economy. … The United States, as the world's richest nation, not only accounts for the largest single share of this expense, currently upward of $60 billion a year, but also"...has devoted a higher proportion [emphasis added] of its gross national product to its military establishment than any other major free world nation……

It is not too much to say that general disarmament would require the scrapping of a critical proportion of the most highly developed occupational specialties in the economy. The political difficulties inherent in such an "adjustment" would make the outcries resulting from the closing of a few obsolete military and naval installations in 1964 sound like a whisper.

The expected impact of disarmament on the economy for special criticism, we can summarize our objections to them in general terms as follows:

1. No proposed program for economic conversion to disarmament sufficiently takes into account the unique magnitude of the required adjustments it would entail.
2. Proposals to transform arms production into a beneficent scheme of public works are more the products of wishful thinking than of realistic understanding of the limits of our existing economic system.
3. Fiscal and monetary measures are inadequate as controls for the process of transition to an arms-free economy.
4. Insufficient attention has been paid to the political acceptability of the objectives of the proposed conversion models, as well as of the political means to be employed in effectuating a transition.
5. No serious consideration has been given, in any proposed conversion plan, to the fundamental nonmilitary function of war and armaments in modern society, nor has any explicit attempt
been made to devise a viable substitute for it. This criticism will be developed in sections 5 and 6.

SECTION 3 - DISARMAMENT SCENARIOS

All such scenarios that have been seriously put forth imply a dependence on bilateral or multilateral agreement between the great powers. In general, they call for a progressive phasing out of gross armaments, military forces, weapons, and weapons technology, coordinated with elaborate matching procedures of verification, inspection, and machinery for the settlement of international disputes.

….. We have seen no proposed disarmament sequence that correlates the phasing out of specific kinds of military spending with specific new forms of substitute spending. Without examining disarmament scenarios in greater detail, we may characterize them with these general comments:

1. No major power can proceed with such a program, however, until it has developed an economic conversion plan fully integrated with each phase of disarmament. No such plan has yet been developed in the United States.

SECTION 4 - WAR AND PEACE AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS

We find at the heart of every peace study we have examined--from the modest technological proposal (e.g., to convert a poison gas plant to the production of "socially useful" equivalents) to the most elaborate scenario for universal peace in our time--lies one common fundamental misconception. It is the source of the miasma of unreality surrounding such plans. It is the incorrect assumption that war, as an institution, is subordinate to the social systems [Government] it is believed to serve.

This misconception, although profound and far-reaching, is entirely comprehensible. Few social clichés are so unquestioningly accepted as the notion that war is an extension of diplomacy (or of politics, or of the pursuit of economic objectives). If this were true, it would be wholly appropriate for economists and political theorists to look on the problems of transition to peace as essentially mechanical or procedural---as indeed they do, treating them as logistic corollaries of the settlement of national conflicts of interest. If this were true, there would be no real substance to the difficulties of transition. For it is evident that even in today's world there exist no conceivable conflict of interest, real or imaginary, between nations or between social forces within nations, that cannot be resolved without recourse to war--if such resolution were assigned a priority of social value.

The point is that the cliché is not true, and the problems of transition are indeed substantive rather than merely procedural. Although war is "used" as an instrument of national and social policy, the fact that a [Government] society is organized for any degree of readiness for war supersedes its political and economic structure. War itself is the basic [Government] social system, within which other secondary modes of social organization conflict or conspire. It is the [War Industry] system which has governed most human societies of record, as it is today.

Once this is correctly understood, the true magnitude of the problems entailed in a transition to peace---itself a social [Governmental] system, but without precedent except in a few simple pre-industrial societies---becomes apparent. At the same time, some of the puzzling superficial contradictions of modern societies can then be readily rationalized.

1. The "unnecessary" size and power of the world war industry;
2. the preeminence of the military establishment in every [Government] society, whether open or concealed;
3. the exemption of military or paramilitary institutions from the accepted social and legal standards of behavior required elsewhere in the society;
4. the successful operation of the armed forces and the armaments producers entirely outside the framework of each nation's economic ground rules [e.g. the laws of supply and demand]:

these and other ambiguities closely associated with the relationship of war to society are easily clarified, once the priority of war-making potential as the principal structuring force in society is accepted. Economic systems, political philosophies, and corpora jures serve and extend the war system, not vice versa.

It must be emphasized that the precedence of a society's war-making potential over its other characteristics is not the result of the "threat" presumed to exist at any one time from other societies.
This is the reverse of the basic situation; "threats" against the "national interest" are usually created
[eNote: written 25 years before 911] or accelerated to meet the changing needs of the war system.

Only in comparatively recent times has it been considered politically expedient to euphemize war
budgets as "defense" requirements. The necessity for governments to distinguish between
"aggression" (bad) and "defense" (good) has been a by-product of rising literacy and rapid
communication. The distinction is tactical only, a concession to the growing inadequacy of ancient war-
organizing political rationales.

Wars are not "caused" by international conflicts of interest. Proper logical sequence would make it
more often accurate to say that war-making societies require—and thus bring about—such conflicts.
The capacity of a nation to make war expresses the greatest social power it can exercise; war-making,
active or contemplated, is a matter of life and death on the greatest scale subject to social control. It
should therefore hardly be surprising that the military institutions in each society claim its highest
priorities.

We find further that most of the confusion surrounding the myth that war-making is a tool of state policy
stems from a general misapprehension of the functions of war. In general, these are conceived as: to
defend a nation from military attack by another, or to deter such an attack; to defend or advance a
"national interest"—economic, political, ideological; to maintain or in-crease a nation's military power
for its own sake. These are the visible, or ostensible, functions of war. If there were no others, the
importance of the war establishment in each society might in fact decline to the subordinate level it
is believed to occupy. And the elimination of war would indeed be the procedural matter that the
disarmament scenarios suggest.

But there are other, broader, more profoundly felt functions of war in modern societies. It is these
invisible, or implied, functions that maintain war-readiness as the dominant force in our societies. And it
is the unwillingness or inability of the writers of disarmament scenarios and reconversion plans to take
them into account that has so reduced the usefulness of their work, and that has made it seem unrelated to
the world we know.

SECTION 5 - THE FUNCTIONS OF WAR

…war as the principal organizing force in most societies has been insufficiently appreciated.

We propose in this section to examine these nonmilitary, implied, and usually invisible functions of
war, to the extent that they bear on the problems of transition to peace for our society…. It is often
necessary for a national military establishment to create a need for its unique powers—to maintain
the franchise, so to speak. And a healthy military apparatus requires "exercise," by whatever rationale
seems expedient, to prevent its atrophy.  [eNote: 911 and the “War on Terror that will not end in our
lifetime.”]

ECONOMIC

The production of weapons of mass destruction has always been associated with economic "waste."
The term is pejorative, since it implies a failure of function. But no human activity can properly be
considered wasteful if it achieves its contextual objective. In the case of military "waste," there is
indeed a larger social utility. It derives from the fact that the "wastefulness" of war production is
exercised entirely outside the framework of the economy of supply and demand. As such, it provides
the only critically large segment of the total economy that is subject to complete and arbitrary central
control. If modern industrial societies can be defined as those which have developed the capacity to
produce more than is required for their economic survival, military spending can be said to furnish the
only balance wheel with sufficient inertia to stabilize the advance of their economies. The fact that war is
"wasteful" is what enables it to serve this function. And the faster the economy advances, the heavier this
balance wheel must be.

"Why is war so wonderful? Because it creates artificial demand...the only kind of artificial demand,
moreover, that does not raise any political issues: war, and only war, solves the problem of inventory."
According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “that the greatly expanded public sector
since World War II, resulting from heavy defense expenditures, has provided additional protection
against depressions, since this sector is not responsive to con- traction in the private sector and has
provided a sort of buffer or balance wheel in the economy.” The principal economic function of war,
in our view, is that it provides just such a flywheel.
Weapons technology structures the economy. **War production is progressive because it is production that would not otherwise have taken place.** A former Secretary of the Army has carefully phrased it for public consumption thus: "If there is, as I suspect there is, a direct relation between the stimulus of large defense spending and a substantially increased rate of growth of gross national product, it quite simply follows that defense spending per se might be countenanced on economic grounds alone [emphasis added] as a stimulator of the national metabolism." Actually, the fundamental nonmilitary utility of war in the economy is far more widely acknowledged than the scarcity of such affirmations as that quoted above would suggest.

Although we do not imply that a substitute for war in the economy cannot be devised, no combination of techniques for controlling employment, production, and consumption has yet been tested that can remotely compare to it in effectiveness. It is, and has been, the essential economic stabilizer of modern societies.

**POLITICAL**

The existence of a society as a political "nation" requires as part of its definition an attitude of relationship toward other "nations." This is what we usually call a foreign policy. But a nation's foreign policy can have no substance if it lacks the means of enforcing its attitude toward other nations. It can do this in a credible manner only if it implies the threat of maximum political organization for this purpose--which is to say that it is organized to some degree for war. War, then, is itself the defining element of any nation's existence vis-a-vis any other nation. Since it is historically axiomatic that the existence of any form of weaponry insures its use, we have used the work "peace" as virtually synonymous with disarmament. By the same token, "war" is virtually synonymous with nationhood. The elimination of war implies the inevitable elimination of national sovereignty and the traditional nation-state.

The war system not only has been essential to the existence of nations as independent political entities, but has been equally indispensable to their stable internal political structure. Without it, no government has ever been able to obtain acquiescence in its "legitimacy," or right to rule its society. The possibility of war provides the sense of external necessity without which no government can long remain in power. The organization of a society for the possibility of war is its principal political stabilizer. It is ironic that this primary function of war has been generally recognized by historians only where it has been expressly acknowledged--in the pirate societies of the great conquerors.

The basic authority of a modern state over its people resides in its war powers. On a day-to-day basis, it is represented by the institution of police, armed organizations charged expressly with dealing with "internal enemies" in a military manner. Like the conventional "external" military, the police are also substantially exempt from many civilian legal restraints on their social behavior.

In advanced modern democratic societies, the war system has provided political leaders with another political-economic function of increasing importance: it has served as the last great safeguard against the elimination of necessary social classes. As economic productivity increases to a level further and further above that of minimum subsistence, it becomes more and more difficult for a society to maintain distribution patterns insuring the existence of "hewers of wood and drawers of water." The further progress of automation can be expected to differentiate still more sharply between "superior" workers and what Ricardo called "menials," while simultaneously aggravating the problem of maintaining an unskilled labor supply. [eNote: The reason why our Southern boarder is so open to illegal intrusion.]

The arbitrary nature of war expenditures and of other military activities make them ideally suited to control these essential class relationships. Obviously, if the war system were to be discarded, new political machinery would be needed at once to serve this vital subfunction. Until it is developed, the continuance of the war system must be assured, if for no other reason, among others, than to preserve whatever quality and degree of poverty a society requires as an incentive, as well as to maintain the stability of its internal organization of power.

**SOCILOGICAL**

Under this heading, we will examine a nexus of functions served by the war system that affect human behavior in society.

The Selective Service System and its analogues elsewhere furnish remarkably clear examples of disguised military utility. Informed persons in this country have never accepted the official rationale for a peacetime draft--military necessity, preparedness, etc. --as worthy of serious consideration. But what has gained credence among thoughtful men is the rarely voiced, less easily refuted, proposition that the
institution of military service has a "patriotic" priority in our society that must be maintained for its own sake. Ironically, the simplistic official justification for selective service comes closer to the mark, once the non-military functions of military institutions are understood. As a control device over the hostile, nihilistic, and potentially unsettling elements of a society in transition, the draft can again be defended, and quite convincingly, as a "military" necessity. [eNote: Keep in mind this was written in 1967 when racial tensions were at a peak in the US and Vietnam was beginning to increase. A good friend I worked with in the Marines told me as a boy he was told to avoid the military because it was a place where blacks became bullet pillows.]

Nor can it be considered a coincidence that overt military activity, and thus the level of draft calls, tend to follow the major fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the lower age groups. This rate, in turn, is a time tested herald of social discontent. It must be noted also that the armed forces in every civilization have provided the principal state-supported haven for what we now call the "unemployable."

In general, the war system provides the basic motivation for primary social organization. In so doing, it reflects on the societal level the incentives of individual human behavior. The most important of these, for social purposes, is the individual psychological rationale for allegiance to a society and its values.

**Allegiance requires a cause; a cause requires an enemy.** This much is obvious; the critical point is that the **enemy** that defines the cause **must seem genuinely formidable.** Roughly speaking, the **presumed power** of the **enemy** sufficient to warrant an individual sense of allegiance to a society must be proportionate to the size and complexity of the society. Today, of course, that power must be one of unprecedented magnitude and frightfulness. [eNote: 911 and the "War on Terrorism."

It follows, from the patterns of human behavior, that the credibility of a social **enemy** demands similarly a **readiness of response in proportion to its menace.** In a broad social context, "an eye for an eye" still characterizes the only acceptable attitude toward a presumed threat of aggression, despite contrary religious and moral precepts governing personal conduct. The remoteness of personal decision from social consequence in a modern society makes it easy for its members to maintain this attitude **without being aware of it.** A recent example is the war in Vietnam; a less recent one was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In each case, the extent and gratuitousness of the slaughter were abstracted into political formulae by most Americans, once the proposition that the victims were "enemies" was established.

What gives the war system its preeminent role in social organization, as elsewhere, is its unmatched authority over life and death. It must be emphasized again that the war system is not a mere social extension of the presumed need for individual human violence, but itself in turn serves to rationalize most nonmilitary killing. It also provides the precedent for the collective willingness of members of a society to pay a blood price for institutions far less central to social organization that war.

But the historical analogy serves as a reminder that a viable substitute for war as a social system cannot be a mere symbolic charade. It **must involve risk of real personal destruction, and on a scale consistent with the size and complexity of modern social systems. Credibility is the key.** Whether the substitute is ritual in nature or functionally substantive, unless it provides a believable life- and-death threat it will not serve the socially organizing function of war.

The existence of an accepted external menace, then, is essential to social cohesiveness as well as to the acceptance of political authority. The menace must be believable, it must be of a magnitude consistent with the complexity of the society threatened, and it must appear, at least, to affect the entire society. [eNote: 911 and the “War on Terror.”]

**ECOLOGICAL**

….. In human societies, those who fight and die in wars for survival are in general its biologically stronger members. This is natural selection in reverse.

**CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC**

The relationship of war to scientific research and discovery is more explicit. War is the principal motivational force for the development of science at every level, from the abstractly conceptual to the narrowly technological.

Beginning with the development of iron and steel, and proceeding through the discoveries of the laws of motion and thermodynamics to the age of the atomic particle, the synthetic polymer, and the space
capsule, no important scientific advance has not been at least indirectly initiated by an implicit requirement of weaponry.

The most direct relationship can be found in medical technology. The Vietnam war alone has led to spectacular improvements in amputation procedures, blood-handling techniques, and surgical logistics. It has stimulated new large-scale research on malaria and other typical parasite diseases; it is hard to estimate how long this work would otherwise have been delayed, despite its enormous nonmilitary importance to nearly half the world's population.

SECTION 6 - SUBSTITUTES FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF WAR

ECONOMIC

Economic surrogates for war must meet two principal criteria. They must be "wasteful," in the common sense of the word, and they must operate outside the normal supply-demand system. A corollary that should be obvious is that the magnitude of the waste must be sufficient to meet the needs of a particular society. An economy as advanced and complex as our own requires the planned average annual destruction of not less than 10 percent of gross national product if it is effectively to fulfill its stabilizing function. The analogy, though crude, is especially apt for the American economy, as our record of cyclical depressions shows. All have taken place during periods of grossly inadequate military spending. [eNote: Bill Clinton's military spending cut backs gave cause for 911.]

Here is the basic weakness of the social-welfare surrogate.

On the short-term basis, a maximum program of this sort could replace a normal military spending program, provided it was designed, like the military model, to be subject to arbitrary control. Public housing starts, for example, or the development of modern medical centers might be accelerated or halted from time to time, as the requirements of a stable economy might dictate.

But on the long-term basis, social-welfare spending, no matter how often redefined, would necessarily become an integral, accepted part of the economy, of no more value as a stabilizer than the automobile industry or old age and survivors' insurance. Another economic surrogate that has been proposed is a series of giant "space research" programs.

POLITICAL

The war system makes the stable government of societies possible. It does this essentially by providing an external necessity for a society to accept political rule. In so doing, it establishes the basis for nationhood and the authority of government to control its constituents. What other institution or combination of programs might serve these functions in its place?

We have already pointed out that the end of the war means the end of national sovereignty, and thus the end of nationhood as we know it today. But this does not necessarily mean the end of nations in the administrative sense, and internal political power will remain essential to a stable society. The emerging "nations" of the peace epoch must continue to draw political authority from some source.

A number of proposals; all are basically juridical in nature. They contemplate institutions more or less like a World Court, or a United Nations, but vested with real authority. It might be argued that a well-armed international police force, operating under the authority of such a supranational "court," could well serve the function of external enemy.

Credibility, in fact, lies at the heart of the problem of developing a political substitute for war. ……

Nevertheless, an effective political substitute for war would require "alternate enemies," some of which might seem equally farfetched in the context of the current war system. It may be, for instance, that gross pollution of the environment can eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear weapons as the principal apparent threat to the survival of the species. Poisoning of the air, and of the principal sources of food and water supply, is already well advanced, and at first glance would seem promising in this respect; it constitutes a threat that can be dealt with only through social organization and political power. But from present indications it will be a generation to a generation and a half before environmental pollution, however severe, will be sufficiently menacing, on a global scale, to offer a possible basis for a solution.

It is true that the rate of pollution could be increased selectively for this purpose; in fact, the mere modifying of existing programs for the deterrence of pollution could speed up the process enough to
make the threat credible much sooner. But the pollution problem has been so widely publicized in recent years that it seems highly improbable that a program of deliberate environmental poisoning could be implemented in a politically acceptable manner.

However unlikely some of the possible alternate enemies we have mentioned may seem, we must emphasize that one must be found, of credible quality and magnitude, if a transition to peace is ever to come about without social disintegration. It is more probably, in our judgment, that such a threat will have to be invented, rather than developed from unknown conditions. Since there is considerable doubt, in our minds, that any viable political surrogate can be devised, we are reluctant to compromise, by premature discussion, any possible option that may eventually lie open to our government.

SOCIOLOGICAL

In a world of peace, the continuing stability of society will require:

1) an effective substitute for military institutions that can neutralize destabilizing social elements and

2) a credible motivational surrogate for war that can insure social cohesiveness.

The first is an essential element of social control; the second is the basic mechanism for adapting individual human drives to the needs of society.

The socially disaffected, the economically unprepared, the psychologically unconformable, the hard-core "delinquents," the incorrigible "subversives," and the rest of the unemployable are seen as somehow transformed by the disciplines of a service modeled on military precedent into more or less dedicated social service workers. [eNote: My first boss in the Marines was told by a judge, go to Jail or the Marines.]

Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of society is the reintroduction, in some form consistent with modern technology and political processes, of slavery. It is entirely possible that the development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an absolute prerequisite for social control in a world at peace. [eNote: Ok, Eric’s twisted mind at work again. What are “illegal immigrants” if nothing more than slaves? I have many friends which are here “illegally.” If we wanted to stop it would could. BUT, we don’t. A good friend of mine was bragging to me the other day that he’d received a $1 dollar an hour raise. He now makes just under $10 an hour, by “arriving an hour early, clocking in for his 8 hours, then clocking out and working another 2 hours.” And he was pleased because after a year of this faithful service he was rewarded with a 1 dollar raise. He stays where he is because he fears this false papers would be discovered if he applied for a new job. Is this not a “sophisticated form of slavery?”]

When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war capable of directing human behavior patterns in behalf of social organization, few options suggest themselves. Like its political function, the motivational function of war requires the existence of a genuinely menacing social enemy. The principal difference is that for purposes of motivating basic allegiance, as distinct from accepting political authority, the "alternate enemy" must imply a more immediate, tangible, and directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for taking and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern.

In this respect, the possible enemies noted earlier would be insufficient. One exception might be the environmental-pollution model, if the danger to society it posed was genuinely imminent. The fictive models would have to carry the weight of extraordinary conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable actual sacrifice of life; the construction of an up-to-date mythological or religious structure for this purpose would present difficulties in our era, but must certainly be considered.

ECOLOGICAL

Considering the shortcomings of war as a mechanism of selective population control,…. It must be remembered that the limitation of war in this function is entirely eugenic. War has not been genetically progressive. But as a system of gross population control to preserve the species it cannot fairly be faulted. …..Current trends in warfare—the increased strategic bombing of civilians (as opposed to purely "military" bases and personnel)—strongly suggest that a truly qualitative improvement is in the making. Assuming the war system is to continue, it is more than probably that the regressively selective quality of war will have been reversed, as its victims become more genetically representative of their
societies. [eNote: Now that “the terrorist enemy” in Iraq could be hiding in any home, any home can be destroyed. Civilians are taking the brunt of “The War on Terror,” as they have been in South East Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, over the past 30 years.]

The real question here, therefore, does not concern the viability of this war substitute, but the political problems involved in bringing it (population control) about. It cannot be established while the war system is still in effect. The reason for this is simple: excess population is war material. As long as any society must contemplate even a remote possibility of war, it must maintain a maximum supportable population, even when so doing critically aggravates an economic liability. This is paradoxical, in view of war’s role in reducing excess population, but it is readily understood. War controls the general population level, but the ecological interest of any single society lies in maintaining its hegemony vis-a-vis other societies.

CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC

SECTION 7 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

THE NATURE OF WAR

War is not, as is widely assumed, primarily an instrument of policy utilized by nations to extend or defend their expressed political values or their economic interests. On the contrary, war is itself the principal basis of organization on which all modern societies are constructed. The common proximate cause of war is the apparent interference of one nation with the aspirations of another. But at the root of all ostensible differences of national interest lie the dynamic requirements of the war system itself for periodic armed conflict. Readiness for war characterizes contemporary social systems more broadly than their economic and political structures, which it subsumes.

Economic analyses of the anticipated problems of transition to peace have not recognized the broad preeminence of war in the definition of social systems. The same is true, with rare and only partial exceptions, of model disarmament "scenarios." Such a plan can be developed only from the premise of full understanding of the nature of the war system it proposes to abolish, which in turn presupposes detailed comprehension of the functions the war system performs for society. It will require the construction of a detailed and feasible system of substitutes for those functions that are necessary to the stability and survival of human societies.

THE FUNCTIONS OF WAR

The visible, military function of war requires no elucidation; it is not only obvious but also irrelevant to a transition to the condition of peace, in which it will by definition be superfluous. It is also subsidiary in social significance to the implied, nonmilitary functions of war, those critical to transition can be summarized in five principal groupings.

1. **ECONOMIC.** War has provided both ancient and modern societies with a dependable system for stabilizing and controlling national economies. No alternate method of control has yet been tested in a complex modern economy that has shown itself remotely comparable in scope or effectiveness. [eNote: This is because the “Military Industrial Complex” is a huge portion of our economic system (10 – 15%) and functions completely outside the economic laws of supply and demand, being centrally controlled by politicians, the pentagon and defense contractors. What gives the Military Industrial Complex its vast power is the Federal Reserve’s ability to create and loan at interest fiat currency from nothing. Without centralized banking systems (which exist in most countries), and are no longer tied to a gold standard, our government would be hard pressed to come up with the funding needed to go to war.]

2. **POLITICAL.** The permanent possibility of war is the foundation for stable government; it supplies the basis for general acceptance of political authority. It has enabled societies to maintain necessary class distinctions, and it has ensured the subordination of the citizen to the state, by virtue of the residual war powers inherent in the concept of nationhood. No modern political ruling group has successfully controlled its constituency after failing to sustain the continuing credibility of an external threat of war.

3. **SOCIOLOGICAL.** War, has uniquely served societies, as an indispensable controller of dangerous social dissidence and destructive antisocial tendencies. …it has played another equally fundamental role: the war system has provided the machinery through which the motivational
forces governing human behavior have been translated into binding social allegiance. [eNote: i.e. 

Patriotism. This is why, although I believe my efforts in questioning are government’s actions with regards to war, are in keeping with the oath I took as a Marine Officer to “Support and Defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic,” others have told me that by even questioning our leaders I should “leave this country.” I love this country, and our Constitution, but I do not agree that our economy is worth the systemic destruction of human life. Especially if this report’s assertions that the Government must “create and enemy” are accurate.] No other institution, or groups of institutions, in modern societies, has successfully served these functions.

4. **ECOLOGICAL.** War has been the principal evolutionary device for maintaining a satisfactory ecological balance between gross human population and supplies available for its survival. It is unique to the human species.

5. **CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC.** War-orientation has determined the basic standards of value in the creative arts, and has provided the fundamental motivational source of scientific and technological progress.

**SUBSTITUTES FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF WAR: CRITERIA**

Discussion of the ways and means of transition to such a world are meaningless unless

a) substitute institutions can be devised to fill these functions, or

b) it can reasonably be hypothesized that the loss or partial loss of any one function need not destroy the viability of future societies.

Such substitute institutions and hypotheses must meet varying criteria. In general, they must be **technically feasible, politically acceptable,** and **potentially credible** to the members of the societies that adopt them. Specifically, they must be characterized as follows:

1. **ECONOMIC.** An acceptable economic surrogate for the war system will require the expenditure of resources for completely nonproductive purposes at a level comparable to that of the military expenditures otherwise demanded by the size and complexity of each society. Such a substitute system of apparent "waste" must be of a nature that will permit it to remain independent of the normal supply-demand economy; it must be subject to arbitrary political control.

2. **POLITICAL.** A viable political substitute for war must posit a **generalized external menace** to each society of a nature and degree sufficient to require the organization and acceptance of political authority. [eNote: and a willingness to kill and be killed in the name of patriotism.]

3. **SOCIOLOGICAL.** First, in the permanent absence of war, new institutions must be developed that will effectively control the socially destructive segments of societies. Second, for purposes of adapting the physical and psychological dynamics of human behavior to the needs of social organization, a credible substitute for war must generate an omnipresent and readily understood fear of personal destruction. This fear must be of a nature and degree sufficient to ensure adherence to societal values to the full extent that they are acknowledged to transcend the value of individual human life.

4. **ECOLOGICAL.** A substitute for war in its function as the uniquely human system of population control must ensure the survival, if not necessarily the improvement, of the species, in terms of its relations to environmental supply.

5. **CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC.** A surrogate for the function of war as the determinant of cultural values must establish a basis of socio-moral conflict of equally compelling force and scope. A substitute motivational basis for the quest for scientific knowledge must be similarly informed by a comparable sense of internal necessity.

**GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

It is apparent, from the foregoing, that no program or combination of programs yet proposed for a transition to peace has remotely approached meeting the comprehensive functional requirements of a world without war. Although one projected system for filling the economic function of war seems promising, similar optimism cannot be expressed in the equally essential political and sociological areas. The other major nonmilitary functions of war---ecological, cultural, scientific---raise very different
problems, but it is least possible that detailed programming of substitutes in these areas is not prerequisite to transition. More important, it is not enough to develop adequate but separate surrogates for the major war functions; they must be fully compatible and in no degree self-canceling.

When asked how best to prepare for the advent of peace, we must first reply, as strongly as we can, that the war system cannot responsibly be allowed to disappear until
1) we know exactly what it is we plan to put in its place, and
2) we are certain, beyond reasonable doubt, that these substitute institutions will serve their purposes in terms of the survival and stability of society.

It is uncertain, at this time, whether peace will ever be possible. The war system, for all its subjective repugnance to important sections of "public opinion" has demonstrated its effectiveness since the beginning of recorded history; it has provided the basis for the development of many impressively durable civilizations, including that which is dominant today. A viable system of peace, would still constitute a venture into the unknown, ....

Government decision-makers tend to choose peace over war whenever a real option exists, because it usually appears to be the "safer" choice. Under most immediate circumstances they are likely to be right. But in terms of long-range social stability, the opposite is true. At our present state of knowledge and reasonable inference, it is the war system that must be identified with stability, the peace system that must be identified with social speculation, however justifiable the speculation may appear, in terms of subjective moral or emotional values. The qualification and the bias are equally irrelevant; any condition of genuine total peace, however achieved, would be destabilizing until proved otherwise.

If it were necessary at this moment to opt irrevocably for the retention or for the dissolution of the war system, common prudence would dictate the former course. …

It is possible that one or more major sovereign nations may arrive, at a position in which a ruling administrative class may lose control of basic public opinion or of its ability to rationalize a desired war. It is not hard to imagine, in such circumstances, a situation in which such governments may feel forced to initiate serious full-scale disarmament proceedings (perhaps provoked by "accidental" nuclear explosions), and that such negotiations may lead to the actual disestablishment of military institutions, this could be catastrophic.

Our final conclusion, therefore, is that it will be necessary for our government to plan in depth for two general contingencies.

The first, and lesser, is the possibility of a viable general peace; In our view, careful preparation for the possibility of peace should be extended, not because we take the position that the end of war would necessarily be desirable, if it is in fact possible, but because it may be thrust upon us in some form whether we are ready for it or not.

the second is the successful continuation of the war system. Planning for rationalizing and quantifying the war system, on the other hand, to ensure the effectiveness of its major stabilizing functions, is not only more promising in respect to anticipated results, but is essential; we can no longer take for granted that it will continue to serve our purposes well merely because it always has. The objective of government policy in regard to war and peace, in this period of uncertainty, must be to preserve maximum options.

Eric Conclusion: So that is the question we must ask ourselves. Has this report been the “blue print,” used by our government to 1. Plan for peace, or 2. “the successful continuation of the war system.” Christ said, “By their fruits ye shall know them.” You judge the fruits; Vietnam, Laos, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Honduras, Samolia…..

Terrifying, if not fascinating, Hermann Goering was of course Hitler's Reich Marshall. Here's what he said about war during the Nuremberg trials to Gustave Gilbert, an American intelligence agent:

“Why, of course, the people don't want war. Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”
To which Gustave Gilbert stated, “There is one difference, in a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”

To which Hermann Goering retorted, "Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country."